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Introduction 
Despite financial economists’ long-standing interest in the role of lender-borrower 
relationships in increasing the availability of funds to small businesses, many questions remain 
unanswered. Numerous empirical studies investigate the effect of relationships on the availability 
and terms of credit to small businesses (Petersen and Rajan (1994), Berger and Udell (1995), 
Blackwell and Winters (1997), Cole (1998), Harhoff and Körting (1998), Elsas and Krahnen 
(1998), Angelini et al.(1998), Degryse and van Cayseele (2000), Bodenhorn (2003)) and many 
find that relationships improve the availability of credit for some categories of small businesses. 
But the studies present mixed results on how relationships affect collateral requirements and 
lending rates, as well as whether relationships affect loan terms and availability via reputation 
enhancement, as modeled by Diamond (1991) and Boot and Thakor (1994), or via information 
capture, as modeled by Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990).   
Much of the empirical relationship lending research focuses on line-of-credit loans.  
Lines of credit are forward commitments financial intermediaries (FIs) make to lend up to a pre-
specified amount over a set time period under terms agreed to when the commitment is made.  
Lines of credit are intended mainly to finance the acquisition and holding of working capital. 
Researchers who focus on lines of credit in the study of relationship lending claim to do so 
because lines of credit are, by their design, “relationship-driven” loans.  They also claim that 
such traditional FI loans as mortgages, equipment loans and motor vehicle loans are “transaction 
driven” rather than “relationship driven” because businesses use them to finance one-time, non-
                                                 
*
 Karlyn Mitchell is an associate professor in finance at North Carolina State University.  Before coming to NCSU 
she worked as an economist at the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.  Her research interests include 
entrepreneurial finance, financial institutions and corporate finance. 
**
 Douglas K. Pearce is a professor in the Department of Economics at North Carolina State University.  His main 
research interests are financial markets, financial institutions, and Federal Reserve policy. 
  
2 
recurring credit needs  (e.g., Berger and Udell (1998)).  Moreover they assert that because 
traditional loans finance real assets that can serve as loan collateral, such loans entail fewer 
information asymmetries and pose less credit risk to the lending FI, thereby obviating the need 
for an on-going lending relationship (cf. Haynes et al.(1999)). According to this view, smaller 
information asymmetries and credit risk should cause traditional small business loans to 
resemble more closely loans to large corporations over public securities markets than to 
relationship-driven loans (cf. Boot and Thakor (2000)).   
While traditional small business loans may indeed involve looser lender-borrower 
relationships than line-of-credit loans, it does not follow that relationships play no role in 
traditional lending. Perhaps the most compelling evidence favoring a possible role for 
relationships is the slowness with which traditional small business loans have become securitized 
(Acs (1999)).  The usual explanations for the irrelevance of relationships in traditional lending 
presuppose that: 1) small business owners seeking traditional loans to finance large, infrequently 
occurring  capital acquisitions are chiefly concerned with getting the lowest possible interest rate, 
making relationships irrelevant to borrowers; and 2) collateralizing loans protects lenders from 
information asymmetries and other contracting problems before and after a loan is made, making 
relationships irrelevant to lenders. While these presumptions may be warranted for small, “life-
style” businesses with no appreciable growth opportunities, neither premise need hold as a 
general rule, as explored below. 
Rational business owners with long-term horizons presumably make investment, 
financing, and operating decisions to optimize owner wealth over the long-term.  If owners 
anticipate growth in the scale of operations, they will need to raise funds to acquire tangible 
assets and working capital in multiple periods. This on-going funds need gives owners an 
incentive to view fundraising as a repeated game rather than a one-time event.  On-going funds 
needs also give owners an incentive to reduce information asymmetries which prevent lenders 
from costlessly verifying owners’ characters or firms’ quality and which adversely affect the 
terms and availability of credit. Owners should, in principle, be able to overcome the 
asymmetries by building good reputations with their lenders through paying regular debt service 
on any loans, be they traditional or line-of-credit loans. In summary, just because firms take out 
loans to buy tangible assets less frequently than loans to fund working capital, it does not follow 
that small business owners pursue one strategy for financing tangible assets and another for 
financing working capital: rational owners should instead follow a single coherent strategy of 
relationship building using all types of loans so as to reduce the costs imposed by information 
asymmetries.
1
 
Relationships may also be useful to lenders who make traditional loans.  The premise that 
information asymmetries and credit risk are inconsequential to traditional loans stems from the 
availability of tangible assets to secure such loans. However, the costs of perfecting a secured 
claim against an asset, repossessing it in the event of loan default and liquidating it are 
significant (cf. Mann (1997)).  Significant costs to the use of collateral raise FIs’ lending rates 
and/or reduce the loan size per dollar of collateral needed for a given level of protection from 
credit risk. But FIs with private information gleaned from relationships could potentially make 
larger loans at lower rates or even reduce the amount of collateral pledged, while maintaining the 
same degree of protection from credit risk.  Hence, the existence of collateral for traditional FI 
loans does not make relationships irrelevant to lenders. 
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 There is an analogous argument from the venture capital literature.  Start-up and young firms seeking to raise 
equity from outside investors are advised to look beyond the offer price, since equity investors often bring other 
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The role of relationships in traditional lending to small businesses is an empirical 
question which has not, to our knowledge, been addressed in the literature. This paper explores 
the impact of relationships on traditional lending by estimating three types of models found in 
the literature on relationship lending: models of loan acceptance, models of security, and models 
of lending rate. Researchers have employed such models in previous studies chiefly to study the 
impact of relationships on lenders’ decisions to accept, secure and price line-of-credit loans.  We 
employ these models here to study the impact of relationships on lenders’ decisions about both 
line-of-credit loans and traditional loans.  
We believe this paper makes several useful contributions.  To our knowledge it is the first 
to present empirical evidence in a US context specifically on the impact of lender-borrower 
relationships on traditional, non-line-of-credit loans.
2
  In addition, our study employs data from 
the relatively little-used 1998 Survey of Small Business Finances (SSBF).  Moreover this study 
is, to our knowledge, the first to present in one paper models estimated on US data for all three 
of the variables studied empirically in the relationship lending literature: credit availability, 
security requirements and loan rate.
3
  We present estimated models for both traditional loans and 
line-of-credit loans. By presenting models of all three variables for both types of loans, we 
believe we present a more complete picture of the role relationships play in small business 
lending.  
To preview our results, we find that relationships have statistically significant effects on 
the probability of loan acceptance, collateral/guarantee requirements and loan rates for both lines 
of credit and traditional loans.  Moreover we find that relationships appear to affect more 
strongly the availability and terms of traditional loans than lines of credit.  While we find 
evidence consistent with both the reputation enhancement and information capture views of 
relationships effects, we conclude that the evidence more consistently supports the information 
capture view. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows.  Section II summarizes the relevant 
theoretical and empirical literature on relationship lending.  Section III presents our hypotheses 
and describes the data.  Section IV presents the empirical results.  Section V summarizes and 
concludes. 
 
I. Small Business Lending: Theory and Evidence 
A. Financial Contracting with Large and Small Businesses 
 The US financial system has developed different technologies for transferring funds from 
investors to large and small businesses.  Large businesses raise funds in both private and public 
securities markets.  Participation in public markets legally obligates large firms to make public 
information about themselves, primarily for the purpose of permitting investor monitoring. But 
large businesses also voluntarily enhance their “informational transparency” in a variety of ways, 
including significant spending on investor relations, so as to facilitate future fund-raising by 
reducing problems related to asymmetric information, adverse selection and moral hazard.
4
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 The study by Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) which uses Belgian data is the only other study  we know that 
examines the impact of relationships on traditional, non-line-of-credit loans; however it is unclear whether Belgian 
banks make loans comparable to line-of-credit loans.  
 
3
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(1998) looks at the effect of relationships on all three variables, however they do so using German data. 
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In contrast to large businesses, small businesses lack access to public securities markets 
because the costs of removing information asymmetries and of monitoring contract compliance 
exceed the benefits to the contracting parties. Instead of raising funds directly from investors 
through financial markets, “informationally opaque” small businesses raise funds indirectly from 
investors through financial intermediaries (FIs) -- especially commercial banks – which obtain 
funds from investors by selling securities and/or accepting deposits. Small businesses are able to 
obtain funds from FIs because FIs reduce the costs of financial contracting so as to make it 
mutually beneficial to both parties.  FIs accomplish this cost reduction in several ways. FIs 
reduce risk to investors by issuing securities and deposits written on diversified portfolios of 
financial contracts with small businesses.  FIs also reduce the problems stemming from 
information asymmetry by developing unique information sources and superior information 
processing skills.  Finally, FIs excel at designing contract terms that facilitate monitoring and 
encourage small businesses to repay.  In summary, FIs are as critical to the transfer of funds from 
investors to small businesses as financial markets are to the transfer of funds from investors to 
large businesses. 
 
B. Relationship Lending 
 Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) show that in credit market equilibrium profit-maximizing FIs 
ration credit to informationally opaque borrowers rather than raising interest rates and/or loan 
collateral requirements because doing so could lead to adverse selection.  The threat of rationing 
creates a powerful incentive for such borrowers as small businesses to seek methods of becoming 
transparent to FIs.  Forming close relationships with FIs is one widely discussed method. 
 
B.1. Theoretical Papers on Relationship Lending 
Theoretical papers that analyze the effects of relationships on credit availability and 
credit terms yield contradictory predictions.  Models by Diamond (1991) and Boot and Thakor 
(1994) find that relationships improve credit availability and credit terms to borrowers.  In both 
models informationally opaque firms seek credit from FIs because asymmetric information and 
potential moral hazard problems prevent the firms from raising funds directly through public 
markets.  In Diamond’s model a firm can build a good reputation with a FI before receiving 
credit (by refraining from morally hazardous behavior) and after receiving credit (by continuing 
to refrain from morally hazardous behavior and by repaying the loan). Diamond shows that a 
good reputation eventually becomes so valuable to the firm that risk of its loss prevents the firm 
from ever engaging in morally hazardous behavior, thereby permitting the firm to move from 
intermediated loans to cheaper unintermediated ones.  In Boot and Thakor’s model firms 
unknown to a FI must borrow at above-market rates using secured (collateralized) loans.  
Securing the loan reduces the firm’s incentive to engage in morally hazardous behavior and 
reduces the loan rate the FI charges. However, securing the loan also dissipates project benefits 
and results in a deadweight loss.  Owing to this loss, Boot and Thakor show the sustainability of 
a repeated game in which a FI rewards a borrower that repays a loan with lower collateral 
requirements and a below-market rate on all subsequent all loans.   Thus credit terms improve 
with relationship length. 
Theoretical papers by Greenbaum et al. 1989) and Sharpe (1990) reach the opposite 
conclusion. In both models a FI grants a loan to an informationally opaque firm. As the firm 
repays the loan the FI gains insight into the firm’s quality; however, this information remains 
private with the FI.  Absent market forces compelling the FI to adjust its lending rate according 
to customer quality, the FI instead exploits its informational advantage and monopoly power 
over the firm by charging an interest rate that exceeds the FI’s cost of funds.  High search costs 
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and the inability to convey credible information about firm quality to competing FIs deter the 
firm from seeking a new lender.  Both models generate the result that, to an extent, FIs attempt to 
lure away one another’s customers by offering loans at rates below costs so as to capture their 
own portfolios of monopoly profits; however fear of adverse selection tempers the competitive 
rate reductions. In both models low-quality firms get too much credit early in a new relationship 
when they are most informationally opaque to the FI.  Thus, both models predict that new 
relationships makes credit more available but that lending rates worsen as relationships lengthen.  
Neither Greenbaum et al. nor Sharpe address the issue of collateral.   
Several theoretical papers develop models of collateralized lending by FIs to 
informationally opaque firms. These, too, reach contradictory conclusions.  Bester (1985) shows 
that if banks choose lending rates and collateral requirements simultaneously, a separating 
equilibrium obtains in which low-risk, high-quality firms choose loans with high collateral 
requirements and low interest rates whereas high-risk, low-quality firms choose loans with low 
collateral requirements and high interest rates.  Besanko and Thakor (1987) get a similar result 
for banks lending in competitive markets.  But models by Bester (1994) and Rajan and Winton 
(1995) generate the opposite result.  Bester (1994) develops a model of “outside collateral,” 
collateral owned by the firm’s entrepreneur but not the firm.  In Bester’s model FIs observe 
borrowing firms’ risk categories.5  He finds that FIs require outside collateral only of riskier 
firms because outside collateral reduces the likelihood these firms will claim insolvency and ask 
to renegotiate their lending contracts when they are, in fact, able to pay.  In Rajan and Winton’s 
model, FIs require collateral of riskier firms because claim to valuable assets gives FIs incentives 
to monitor firms and acquire private information about them before loan default, incentives FIs 
do not have in the absence of collateral due to free rider problems. 
 
B.2. Empirical Studies of Relationship Lending 
Empirical studies of the effect of relationships on lending to small businesses have 
focused on relationships’ effects on availability of credit, collateral requirements and lending 
rates.  Table 1 summarizes the most recent empirical studies.    
 
B.2.a. Empirical Studies of Credit Availability Effects of Relationships  
Researchers studying the effects of relationships on credit availability have used a variety 
of approaches.  Petersen and Rajan (1995) look for evidence that relationships improve credit 
availability by estimating models of trade credit repayment.  Since trade credit is more expensive 
than loans from financial institutions, they reason that if lender relationships improve the 
availability of credit to borrowing firms, firms with relationships will be less likely to pay their 
suppliers late and more likely to pay quickly and take cash discounts for prompt payment.  
Petersen and Rajan estimate tobit models of the probability of late trade credit repayment and the 
fraction of cash discounts taken on data from the 1988-89 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances.  They find that the longer a firm’s longest banking relationship, the less likely it is to 
pay trade creditors late and the higher the fraction of cash discounts taken.  Thus they conclude 
that relationships improve credit availability.   
Cole (1998) takes a different approach to studying the effect of relationships on credit 
availability. He develops a logistic regression model of the probability that a firm’s loan 
application will be approved and estimates it on data from the 1993 National Survey of Small 
Business Finances.  Cole finds that firms applying to lenders with whom they have no prior 
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relationship are less likely to have their applications approved.  Like Petersen and Rajan, Cole 
concludes that relationships improve credit availability. 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) use the approach of Petersen and Rajan (1994) to study the 
effect of relationships on line-of-credit availability for a sample of small German firms.  They 
find that credit becomes less available as the number of lenders increases, a result consistent with 
the declining value of FIs’ private information as relationship exclusivity declines as well as 
declining incentives FIs have to monitor borrowers due to free-rider problems.  Aside from this, 
Harhoff and Körting find no measurable effect of relationships on the availability of credit. 
Angelini et al. (1998) investigate the effect of relationships on line-of-credit availability 
by developing a probit model of the factors that lead young firms to report themselves as being 
liquidity constrained.  They estimate the model on a data sample of small young Italian firms and 
find that the longer firms’ relationships with their primary banks, the less likely the firms are to 
report themselves as liquidity constrained. Angelini et al. conclude that relationships improve 
credit availability. 
While the previously mentioned studies generally find that prior lending relationships 
improve credit availability for small firms, they do not specifically address the possibility that 
relationship may have differential effects on the availability of line-of-credit and traditional 
loans.  Harhoff and Körting and Angel et al. both use European data on line-of-credit loans and 
reach contradictory conclusions.  Petersen and Rajan and Cole both use American data on all 
loans and both conclude that relationships improve credit availability.  But they do not address 
the possibility that relationships may have differential effects on the availability of line-of-credit 
and traditional loans.
6
   
 
B.2.b. Empirical Studies of Collateral Requirement Effects of Relationships 
Several empirical studies have addressed the effect of relationships on collateral 
requirements.  Berger and Udell (1995) estimate logistic regression models of the probability that 
banks require collateral for line-of-credit loans.  They find that the probability of collateral 
requirements decreases with increasing relationship length, consistent with the reputation 
enhancement view of relationship lending.  However, this finding holds only for firms with total 
assets above the sample median: for firms with below-median assets relationship length has no 
statistically significant effect on collateral requirements.  Like Berger and Udell, Harhoff and 
Körting (1998) find that the incidence of collateral securing credit lines declines with 
relationship length.  But Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) find that banks are significantly more 
likely to require collateral from firms with whom the scope of the relationship is deepest, 
consistent with the information capture view.
7
   
A possible explanation for the opposing empirical results found in the collateral studies 
lies with differences in loan types.  Berger and Udell and Harhoff and Körting restrict their 
samples to bank lines of credit, whereas Degryse and van Cayseele’s sample includes five types 
of non-line-of-credit loans: business mortgages, bridge loans, credit to prepay taxes, term loans 
and installment loans.  These types include at least some loans often characterized as transaction-
                                                 
6
 Cole (1998) comes closest to considering the possibility of differential effects.  He re-estimates his final model on 
loans whose purpose is to finance working capital needs, which are usually financed with lines of credit.  He finds 
that his model fits the data slightly better than when all loans are used.  However he does not go on to re-estimate his 
final model on traditional loans for the purpose of comparing the relationship effects.  
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 Bodenhorn (2003) develops a model of the number of guarantors a bank requires on a loan.  He estimates his 
model on 19
th
 century US data using Poisson regression.  He finds some support for the hypothesis that the number 
of guarantors declines with greater closeness in the lender-borrower relationship, as measured by frequency of 
borrowing and length of relationship. 
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driven loans (e.g., business mortgages).  Hence the empirical evidence could be interpreted as 
showing that relationships influence collateral requirements as per the reputation enhancement 
view for bank lines-of-credit, but per the information capture view for more traditional FI loans. 
Of the previous empirical studies only Berger and Udell use American data.  Whether American 
data would show that relationships affect collateral requirements for line-of-credit and traditional 
loans differently is an unexplored question.  
 
B.2.c. Empirical Studies of Interest Rate Effects of Relationships 
  More investigated than the effect of lending relationships on credit availability or 
collateral requirements is the effect of lending relationships on interest rates. Petersen and Rajan 
(1994) develop a regression model of the loan rate and estimate it on a sample of line-of-credit 
and non-line-of-credit loans drawn from the 1988-89 National Survey of Small Business 
Finances.  They find that lenders having stronger relationships with borrower firms offer interest 
rates no different from those they offer to new, unknown borrowers, contrary to both the revenue 
enhancement and information capture views.  Berger and Udell (1995) argue that Petersen and 
Rajan’s results stem from having aggregated relationship-driven line-of-credit loans together 
with transaction-driven non-line-of-credit loans, whose interest rates are market-determined 
rather than relationship-determined.  Berger and Udell estimate a regression model of the spread 
over the prime lending rate paid by borrowers in a sample of line-of-credit loans drawn from the 
1988-89 National Survey of Small Business Finances. They find that the lending rate decreases 
as a relationship lengthens, consistent with the reputation enhancement view of relationships. But 
this conclusion applies only to firms with above-median total assets; for smaller firms 
relationships have no statistically significant effect on lending rate. Following Berger and Udell, 
Blackwell and Winters (1997) develop a regression model of the spread over prime paid by small 
firms borrowing via lines of credit and estimate it on a proprietary data sample.  They find that 
relationship length has no effect on loan rate but that loan rate does decline with a rise in the 
percentage of the borrowing firm’s total outstanding debt lent by the relationship bank.  
Blackwell and Winters interpret their findings as being consistent with the revenue enhancement 
view.  It should be noted that the firms in Blackwell and Winters’ sample are substantially larger 
than those in 1988-89 NSSBF used by Berger and Udell and Petersen and Rajan.
8
 
 The effect of lending relationships on lending rate has also been the subject of several 
papers using European data.  Harhoff and Körting (1998) estimate a model of the loan rate on a 
sample of line-of-credit loans to small German businesses and find little evidence that 
relationships affect the loan rate.  Elsas and Krahnen (1998) reach a similar conclusion after 
estimating a model of the loan rate spread over FIBOR on a sample of line-of-credit loans to 
medium-size German firms.  In contrast Angelini et al. (1998) estimate a regression model of the 
loan rate on a sample of line-of-credit bank loans to small Italian firms and find that loan rates 
increase with relationship length, consistent with the information capture view.  Degryse and van 
Cayseele (2000) reach a similar conclusion from estimating a model of loan rate on data for non-
line-of-credit bank loans to small Belgian firms. 
 A factor contributing to the contradictory findings on the effect of lending relationships 
on lending rates is heterogeneity in the sampled loan types, firm sizes, and institutional contexts.  
The two US studies that use line-of-credit loans suggest that lending relationships reduce loan 
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rates as per the reputation enhancement view, at least for small firms above a certain size.  Of all 
the studies only Degryse and van Cayseele’s (2000) investigates whether relationships influence 
loan rates for traditional, non-line-of-credit loans to very small firms, doing so in the Belgian 
context.  They find evidence in favor of information capture.  The contradictory results from 
previous studies combined with the dearth of evidence on how relationships affect loan rates for 
traditional loans warrant a new look at the relationship – loan rate nexus.  
 
II. Hypotheses and Data  
 In light of the foregoing discussion we state our central hypotheses as follows: 
 
o H1. Traditional (non-line-of-credit) loans to small businesses are “relationship loans” 
similar to line-of-credit loans. 
 
o H2. Traditional (non-line-of-credit) loans to small businesses are “transaction loans” 
similar to capital market loans. 
 
These opposing hypotheses capture the opposing perceptions of traditional loans reflected in 
previous empirical studies of relationship lending.  H1 supports the approach of Petersen and 
Rajan (1994) and Cole (1998) of aggregating data on traditional and line-of-credit loans to study 
relationship effects, as well as the approach of Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) in using only 
traditional loans to study relationship effects.  H2 supports the approach of Berger and Udell 
(1995), Blackwell and Winters (1997), Harhoff and Körting (1998), Elses and Krahnan (1998) 
and Angelini (1998) of excluding data on traditional loans in studying relationships on grounds 
that transaction loans are not relationship driven. 
 While the focus of our investigation is on H1 and H2, our work also produces evidence 
pertaining to two other hypotheses:
9
 
 
o H3. As a borrower becomes more informationally transparent to a lender through an on-
going relationship the lender improves the availability of credit, requires less security and 
decreases the loan rate.  
 
o H4. As a borrower becomes more informationally transparent to a lender through an on-
going relationship the lender does not change or even worsens the availability of credit, 
the amount of security required and the loan rate.  
 
These opposing hypotheses capture the competing views of the effect of relationships on credit 
terms and availability found in the theoretical literature on relationship lending.  H3 is consistent 
with models put forth by Diamond (1991) and Boot and Thakor (1994), whereas H4 is consistent 
the analysis of Greenbaum et al. (1989) and Sharpe (1990).   
 To test hypotheses H1 – H4 we estimate models having the following general form: 
dependent variable = f ( firm attributes, market attributes,  
loan contract attributes, lender-borrower relationship attributes)  
+ error term, 
(1) 
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 Hypotheses H3 and H4 are similar to hypotheses H2 and H1, respectively, in Harhoff and Körting (1998). 
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Following previous studies we estimate models for each of three different dependent variables: 
the probability that a lender accepts a loan application; the probability that a lender requires a 
loan to be secured with collateral or guarantees; and the interest rate a lender sets on a loan less 
the then-prevailing prime rate.  For each variable we estimate models using data that include 
both traditional loans and line-of-credit loans; we then re-estimate the models using sub-samples 
of traditional loans and line-of-credit loans.  The coefficient estimates of the lender-borrower 
relationship attributes provide evidence on hypotheses H1 – H4.  In particular, H1 will be 
supported by the finding of statistically significant coefficient estimates for the relationship 
attributes in models estimated on data for traditional loans, while H2 will be supported if the 
coefficient estimates are statistically insignificant.  For models estimated on the full sample of 
loans or either sub-sample, H3 will be supported by coefficient estimates for the relationship 
attributes that suggest improving loan terms whereas H4 will be supported by coefficient 
estimates that suggest unchanging or worsening terms. 
The data used to estimate Equation (1) come from the 1998 Survey of Small Business 
Finances (SSBF). This survey, conducted at five-year intervals for the Federal Reserve Board, 
collects extensive financial and non-financial information on the surveyed firms, including 
information about their dealings with funding sources.  The 1998 survey was conducted during 
1999-2000 and queried a nationally-representative sample of small businesses in operation 
during December 1998.  The survey defines a small business as a non-farm, non-financial 
business having fewer than 500 full-time employees.  The 1998 sample surveyed 3,561 firms 
representative of the 5.3 million small businesses in operation during December 1998.
10
 
 A subsection of the SSBF inquires about a firm’s most recent loan application including 
the lender’s name, the extent of the lender-borrower relationship, whether the lender accepted or 
rejected the application and, if the application was accepted, features of the loan contract.  Eight 
hundred seventy nine of the firms surveyed provided details of their most recent loan application.  
Of these, 17 were excluded because they lacked data on assets or sales revenue.  This left 862 
credit-seeking firms for our analysis.   
The variables used to estimate Equation (1) are defined in Table 2. All of them have 
appeared in one or more of the empirical studies of relationship lending summarized in Table 1.  
Of the five variables representing firm attributes, two reflect degree of informational 
opacity while three reflect default risk.  LNFIRMAGE is the log of a respondent firm’s age in 
years; LNSALES is the log of the firm’s annual sales revenue in fiscal year 1998.  Greater values 
of both variables should be associated with lesser degrees of informational opacity.  The log 
specification allows the marginal effects of age and size increases to diminish.   BUSDELINQ is 
the number of delinquencies on recent business obligations of a surveyed firm; 
PROPART_PERDEL is the number of delinquencies on recent personal obligations of the 
principal owner of a firm organized as either a proprietorship or a partnership. 
PROPART_PERDEL is included along with BUSDELINQ because the finances of small, non-
corporate firms are known to be intertwined with those of their owners (Ang et al. (1995)). 
RATING is the surveyed firm’s Dun and Bradstreet credit rating, which is publicly available 
information.  Increases in BUSDELINQ, PROPART_PERDEL and RATING are associated with 
greater loan default risk.
11
 
12
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 Certain types of firms were over-sampled in the survey.  Thus in order to make inferences about population 
parameters we weighted the observations in all our empirical work. 
11
  Other variables used by prior researchers to characterize firm attributes were included in preliminary empirical 
work but proved to have little or no explanatory power in this sample.  These variables include the log of total 
assets, the current ratio, quick ratio, several profitability ratios, and several leverage ratios. Adjusting the ratios to 
reflect differences among industries also proved fruitless.  
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 HHI3_B, a variable based on the Herfindahl index for the commercial bank industry in 
the MSA or county where the respondent firm is headquartered, gauges competitive conditions 
of the loan market facing a respondent firm. Higher values of HHI3 imply lesser degrees of 
competition. Besanko and Thakor (1987), Petersen and Rajan (1995), Boot and Thakor (2000) all 
present theoretical models showing that lenders exhibit different behavior depending upon the 
competitiveness of the loan market. 
 Five variables represent loan contract characteristics.  ACCEPTED and SECURED are 
zero-one binary variables indicating whether a surveyed firm’s most recent loan application was 
accepted and, if so, whether it required collateral or a guarantee.  SPREAD is the interest rate on 
the firm’s most recent loan less the prime rate prevailing when the loan was granted.   
LNAMOUNT and LNMATURITY are included to control for the size of the loan requested on a 
firm’s most recent loan application and the original term to maturity on the loan if the application 
was accepted. 
  Four variables characterize lender-borrower relationships.  LNLENGTH is the log of the 
length of the business relationship between a firm and the lender most recently applied to; 
NOPRINFO is a zero-one binary variable coded one if there is no prior relationship. Including 
both LNLENGTH and NOPRINFO in Equation (1) allows for differences in lender behavior 
before the start of a relationship, when a firm is most informationally opaque to the lender, and 
after the initiation of a relationship, when the firm has become more transparent.   
NUMOLOANSOURCES, the number of lenders besides the lender applied to, is included to 
proxy the quality and exclusivity of the lender’s private information about the firm as well as the 
presence of possible free-rider problems.  PRIMEFI, a zero-one binary variable, indicates 
whether the lender applied to is the firm’s primary financial institution.  PRIMEFI proxies 
relationship depth.
13
 
 Table 3 presents summary statistics for the variables listed in Table 2.  Sample means and 
standard errors are reported for all loan applications, for line-of-credit loan applications, and for 
traditional loan applications. T-tests for differences in the variable means for line-of-credit 
applications and traditional loan applications are also shown.  
Firms that applied for line-of-credit and traditional loans show both similarities and 
differences in characteristics.  The sampled firms average 8.7 years in age and just under 
$290,000 in annual sales.  Firms that applied for traditional loans average one-third year older 
and $60,000 more in annual sales than credit-line applicants.  Loan applicants show no 
difference in their proclivity for loan default: the sample means of BUSDELINQ, 
PROPART_PERDEL and RATING for line-of-credit and traditional loans are statistically 
indistinguishable.  In addition, applicants for both loans types faced loan markets characterized 
by similar degrees of competition: the means for HHI3_B are statistically identical.   
                                                                                                                                                             
 
12
 Also included among the explanatory variables in every model estimated were three binary variables to control 
for the surveyed firm’s organizational form (partnership, S-corporation or C-corporation) and eight binary variables 
to control for the firm’s industry based on the firm’s 2-digit SIC code (construction and mining, primary 
manufacturing, other manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, insurance and real estate, business 
services and professional services).  Because the coefficient estimates of these variables achieved statistical 
significance only rarely, none of them are reported in the subsequent tables. 
 
13
 All seven studies summarized in Table 1 included a variable similar to LNLENGTH in their models.  Cole (1998) 
uses a variable like NOPRINFO.  Petersen and Rajan (1994), Cole (1998) and Harhoff and Körting (1998) include a 
variable analogous to NUMOLOANSOURCES.  Elsas and Krahnen (1998), Angelini et at. (1998) and Degryse and 
van Cayseele (2000) include a variable analogous to PRIMEFI. 
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The contract characteristics of line-of-credit and traditional loans granted to the 
respondent firms differ in several respects.  Applications for traditional loans were accepted 
more often and were accepted for larger amounts than applications for credit lines (86% versus 
65%, and $36,000 versus $27,000, respectively).  Accepted traditional loans also had greater 
average original terms to maturity (just over 3 years versus almost ten months).  Not surprisingly 
lenders more often required security on traditional loans than line-of-credit loans; but the relative 
proportions are, perhaps, surprising: 82% of traditional loans versus 67% of line-of-credit loans. 
The similarity in the two proportions calls into question the claim that line-of-credit loans are 
pure relationship loans whereas traditional loans are pure asset-based loans (cf., Berger and 
Udell 2002): the difference between the two loan types may be more one of degree than of kind.  
In addition, the significant number of unsecured traditional loans contravenes one of the two 
premises for the presumed irrelevance of relationships to traditional loans, namely that collateral 
protects lenders from default risk and removes the need to overcome information asymmetries 
through relationships. The other premise, that firms financing large, infrequent capital 
expenditures are chiefly concerned with getting the lowest possible interest rate, is neither 
confirmed nor refuted by the data: the average interest rate spread above prime is statistically 
identical between accepted line-of-credit loans and traditional loans. 
 Finally, the sample statistics show that firms that applied for line-of-credit and traditional 
loans are more alike than different in their relationships with the lenders they applied to.  
Specifically, applicants for both loan types had no prior relationship with about one-quarter of 
the FIs they applied to, and applicants for both loan types averaged slightly more than one other 
lender besides the lender applied to in the survey.  In addition, 51% of the applicants for both 
loan types reported that the FI they applied to was their primary FI.  Only the average 
relationship length differs statistically between firms that applied for line-of-credit and 
traditional loans (13 months versus 19 months, respectively). 
 To elucidate relationships among the variables we present a matrix of Pearson correlation 
coefficients in Table 4.  The correlations are generally quite low, with all but 21 of the 105 
correlations lying between -0.20 and +0.20, and all but 8 lying between -0.30 and +0.30. 
LNSALES is moderately correlated with PROPART_PERDEL and LNAMOUNT (-0.405 and 
0.572 respectively) and the relationship variables NOPRINFO, LNLENGTH and PRIMEFI 
exhibit moderate degrees for correlation.   
  
III. Empirical Results 
III.A. Results from Estimated Models of Credit Availability 
 To study the impact of pre-existing relationships on credit availability we follow Cole 
(1998) and use logistic regression to estimate models having the form
14
: 
 
Probability(a loan application is accepted) 
= f ( firm attributes, market attributes, 
loan contract attributes, lender-borrower relationship attributes) 
+ error term, 
(2) 
Although testing for relationship effects on credit availability may seem superfluous given data 
to test for relationship effects on security and lending rates, the latter tests are actually joint tests 
                                                 
14
 We choose the approach of Cole (1998) over that of Petersen and Rajan (1994) because it is affords a more direct 
test of the effect of relationships on credit availability.  Data availability prevents us from using the approach of 
Angelini et al. (1998). 
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of whether (i) lenders use relationships to gather valuable private information about 
informationally opaque borrower firms; (ii) lenders use this information to adjust loan terms and 
prices; and (iii) the adjustments are discernible in the data.
15
  But in a world with equilibrium 
credit rationing, relationships might well affect the availability of credit without affecting the 
terms or price of credit (i.e., (i) occurs but (ii) and (iii) do not).  If so, the coefficients of the 
relationship variables will tend towards statistical significance in estimated models of credit 
availability but not in estimated models of security or loan rate.  Conversely should (i), (ii) and 
(iii) occur the coefficients of the relationship variables will tend towards statistical significance 
in all three estimated models and estimated models of credit availability will, though redundant, 
provide an additional check on the robustness of the other model estimates. 
 In preparation for estimating Equation (2) we stratified the sample of 862 loan 
applications into sub-samples of approved and rejected applications and then further stratified the 
applications into sub-samples of approved and rejected line-of-credit applications and approved 
and rejected traditional bank loan applications. 
To gain insight into the data before estimating Equation (2) we used the data to compute 
summary statistics for the equation’s independent variables.  Table 5 reports statistics for all loan 
applications (Panel A), for line-of-credit applications (Panel B), and for traditional loan 
applications (Panel C).  In each panel statistics for approved and rejected loan applications 
appear in Columns 2 and 3, respectively. Column 4 reports t-tests of the hypothesis of identical 
sample means for approved and rejected applications.
16
 
 The statistics reveal both similarities and differences in the firm, loan market, and 
contract attributes of approved and denied loan applications.  Compared with denied 
applications, approved applications came from firms averaging greater age, greater annual sales, 
fewer delinquent payments, and better public credit ratings. The same statement holds for the 
sub-samples of line-of-credit and traditional loan applications, except that average firm age is 
statistically identical in the sub-samples of approved and denied line-of-credit loan applications.  
Successful applicants for all loans and for traditional loans were headquartered in more 
competitive banking markets than unsuccessful applicants, on average, but average banking 
market competitiveness was statistically indistinguishable in the markets where successful and 
unsuccessful line-of-credit applicants were headquartered.   Approved line-of-credit applications 
asked for larger loans than denied applications, on average, though the average amounts 
requested on traditional loan applications approved and denied are statistically identical. A 
similar statement applies for all loan applications.  
 The statistics also show similarities and differences in the lender-borrower relationship 
attributes of successful and unsuccessful loan applicants. Compared with unsuccessful 
applicants, successful applicants applied more frequently to their primary FIs and less frequently 
to FIs with whom they had no prior relationship; this statement applies to all loans, to lines-of-
credit, and to traditional loans.  Successful applicants also averaged longer prior relationships 
with the FIs they applied to than unsuccessful applicants (18 months versus 13 months). The 
difference in average relationship length is slightly greater for traditional loan applicants than for 
all loan applicants (20 months versus 13 months), but is indistinguishable from zero for 
successful and unsuccessful line-of-credit applicants (about 13 months). Also, successful and 
                                                 
15
 This reasoning is due to Berger and Udell (1995). 
 
16
 No statistics are reported for the contract characteristic variables LNMATURITY, SECURED or SPREAD as data 
for these variables were only available for accepted loan applications. The variable ACCEPTED is reflected in the 
approved / denied dichotomization. 
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unsuccessful loan applicants showed no statistical difference in the average number of other loan 
sources to which they had access. 
 Table 6 reports estimates of Equation (2) produced using logistic regression.  In all, six 
model estimates are reported: two estimated on data for all loan applications, two estimated on 
data for line-of-credit loan applications only, and two estimated on data for traditional loan 
applications only.  The first estimate in each pair is an estimate of a restricted version of 
Equation (2) that omits the relationship explanatory variables; the second of each pair is an 
estimate of the full model.    
 Looking first at the restricted models, the estimates generally confirm the patterns 
reported in Table 5.  The model estimates show an application’s acceptance probability improves 
significantly with increases in firm age and annual sales volume and diminishes significantly 
with increases in delinquent payments by either the firm or the firm’s principal owner.  
Interestingly RATING, the publicly-available measure of credit worthiness, fails to achieve 
statistical significance in any model estimate, a result consistent with lenders using privately 
available information gathered from relationships to make loan decisions on informationally 
opaque firms.  As expected from Table 5, increasing lender market competition increases the 
probability of loan acceptance for all loans and for traditional loans, though not line-of-credit 
loans (the coefficient estimates of HHI3_B are negative). At variance with the Table 5 statistics 
are the coefficient estimates of LNAMOUNT: increasing the size of the loan applied for 
significantly reduces an application’s acceptance probability for all loans and for traditional 
loans, though not for line-of-credit loans. 
 Adding the relationship variables to the restricted model and re-estimating has little effect 
on the coefficient estimates of the non-relationship variables.  This is unsurprising, given the 
generally low Pearson correlation coefficients reported in Table 4.  The coefficient estimates of 
LNFIRMAGE and HHI3_B become larger in absolute value and gain in statistical significance 
in all three model estimates but especially in the model estimates for line-of-credit loan 
applications. 
 Estimates of the full model confirm the importance of relationships to the availability of 
credit for both line-of-credit loans and traditional loans.  The probability of loan acceptance 
declines when a firm applies to lenders with whom it has no prior relationship, but increases 
when it applies to its primary FI (the coefficient estimates of NOPRIFNO and PRIMEFI are 
significantly negative and positive, respectively).  This result holds for all loan applications, line-
of-credit applications and traditional loan applications, although the coefficient estimates are 
smaller in absolute value and statistically less significant in the model estimated for traditional 
loan applications. The enhanced probability of loan acceptance when a firm applies to its 
primary FI is consistent with the reputation enhancement view and hypothesis H3.   However, 
longer relationships reduce the probability of loan acceptance in all three model estimates (the 
coefficient estimates of LNLENGTH are all significantly negative), a result consistent with the 
information capture view and hypothesis H4. Among the relationship explanatory variables only 
NUMOLOANSOURCES fails to have much impact on credit availability. 
17
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 Predicted to be negatively related to the probability of loan acceptance, the coefficient estimate of 
NUMOLOANSOURCES is statistically insignificant in the equation for all loan applications, negative but 
insignificant at the 10% level in the equation for all traditional loan applications, and positive and significant at the 
10% level in the equation for line-of-credit loan applications. The positive coefficient estimate in the last equation 
might represent a certification effect whereby loans from other lenders signal a high-quality project to the lender 
applied to, raising the probability of loan acceptance. 
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 Chi-square tests of the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the relationship 
variables are jointly zero add further evidence to the importance of relationships to the 
availability of both line-of-credit loans and traditional loans.  The test statistics, reported at the 
bottom of Table 6, show rejection of the hypothesis at the 1% level for all loan applications, line-
of-credit applications and traditional loan applications. These results support H1 over H2.  
Traditional loans and line-of-credit loans are both relationship loans. 
 
III.B. Results from Estimated Models of Security 
 To study the impact of pre-existing relationships on the security lenders require we 
follow Berger and Udell (1995) and Degryse and van Cayseele (2000) and use logistic regression 
to estimate models having the form:
18
 
Probability(a lender requires collateral or a guarantee) 
 = f ( firm attributes, market attributes,  
loan contract attributes, lender-borrower relationship attributes)  
+ error term, 
(3) 
In our sample of 862 loan applications, data about lenders’ security requirements are 
available only for the 703 applications lenders approved. In preparing to estimate Equation (3) 
we stratified these observations into sub-samples of secured and unsecured loans, and then 
further stratified the sub-samples according to whether the loans were line-of-credit loans or 
traditional loans. 
To get an understanding of the data before estimating Equation (3) we used the data to 
compute summary statistics for the equation’s independent variables.  We report the results in 
Table 7.  Panels A, B and C report summary statistics for all loans, for line-of-credit loans, and 
for traditional loans, respectively.  In every panel columns 2 and 3 report statistics for secured 
and unsecured loans, respectively, and column 4 reports t-tests of the hypothesis that the sample 
means are identical for secured and unsecured loans.
19
 
 The data reveal subtle differences in the characteristics of firms granted secured and 
unsecured loans.  Although firms required to secure their loans have the same average age as 
firms that were not, they have higher average annual sales. While this latter result seems 
counterintuitive, it probably reflects the moderately positive correlation between annual sales and 
loan amount.
20
  Compared with firms granted unsecured loans, those granted secured loans 
averaged more business delinquencies, implying that lenders require security from firms with 
observably greater risk (cf. Berger and Udell (1990)).  Firms with secured traditional loans 
average significantly higher Dun and Bradstreet risk ratings than firms with unsecured traditional 
loans, but the average risk ratings for secured and unsecured line-of-credit loans is statistically 
identical.  Curiously, proprietorships and partnerships with secured loans averaged fewer 
personal delinquencies than their counterparts with unsecured loans, but the difference is 
statistically significant only for traditional loans. Fewer personal delinquencies for firms with 
secured loans is indicative of signaling behavior described by Bester (1985) and Besanko and 
Thakor (1987). 
 The Table 7 statistics show firms granted secured and unsecured loans faced loan markets 
having similar competitive conditions: the average degree of banking market concentration is 
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 Harhoff  and  Körting (1998) use probit regression to estimate a model similar to Equation (2). 
19
 No statistics are reported for the contract characteristic variable ACCEPTED as all these applications were 
accepted. The variable SECURED is reflected in the secured / unsecured dichotomization. 
 
20
 Table 4 shows that the Pearson correlation coefficient between LNSALES and LNAMOUNT is +0.572. 
  
15 
statistically identical for firms with secured and unsecured loans at the 10% level.  Banking 
market concentration is nearly greater for firms with lines of credit that are secured rather than 
unsecured: the difference just misses statistically significance at the 10% level.   
 The summary statistics exhibit distinct differences in the contract characteristics of 
secured and unsecured loans.  Compared with unsecured loans, secured loans average 
significantly larger loan amounts and significantly greater maturities.  This statement applies to 
all loans, to line-of-credit loans and to traditional loans. 
 The statistics also show that secured and unsecured loans differ significantly in their 
average relationship attributes. Compared with unsecured loans, secured loans averaged shorter 
relationship lengths, greater frequency of no prior relationships, less exclusive relationships, and 
greater frequency of tangential relationships.  These statements apply to all loans, to traditional 
loans, and to line-of-credit loans, except that secured and unsecured line-of-credit loans do not 
differ statistically in their average frequencies of no prior relationships and tangential 
relationships. 
Table 8 reports estimates of Equation (3) produced using logistic regression.  In all, six 
model estimates are reported: two estimated on data for all accepted loans, two estimated on data 
for all accepted line-of-credit loans, and two estimated for all accepted traditional loans.  The 
first estimate in each pair is an estimate of a restricted version of Equation (3) that omits the 
relationship explanatory variables; the second of each pair is an estimate of the full model.    
Looking first at the restricted models, the model estimates suggest differences in the 
factors influencing the probabilities that line-of-credit and traditional loans will be secured.  
Increases in a firm’s delinquent obligations increases the probability that the firm must secure its 
traditional loans thought not its line-of-credit loans, whereas increasing the degree of banking 
market concentration a firm faces increases the probability the firm must secure its line-of-credit 
loans though not its traditional loans.  Greater terms to maturity increase the probability a line-
of-credit loan must be secured, though not a traditional loan.  The remaining explanatory 
variables have qualitatively similar effects on the probabilities that line-of-credit and traditional 
loans will be secured. Specifically, increasing loan amount increases the probability that any loan 
is secured, whereas increasing a firm’s informational opacity, as proxied by LNFIRMAGE and 
LNSALES, or a firm’s publicly available risk ranking, RATING, has no statistical discernible 
effect on the probability that loans of either type are secured. 
 Adding the relationship variables to the restricted models has little impact on the 
coefficient estimates of the non-relationship variables.  LNFIRMAGE achieves statistical 
significance with a negative coefficient in the model for traditional loans, implying falling 
security requirements as increasing age makes a borrowing firm more informationally 
transparent to lenders.  Otherwise the coefficient estimates of the non-relationship variables 
remain virtually unchanged. 
 Estimates of the full model confirm the importance of relationships to the security 
requirements of both line-of-credit and traditional loans, in addition to confirming differences in 
the effects of relationships on security requirements across the two loans types.  The estimated 
model for line-of-credit loans shows that the probability of a secured loan increases with 
declining exclusivity of the lender-borrower relationship (the estimated coefficient of 
NUMOLOANSOURCES is negatively signed).  The other relationship variables have no 
discernible impact on the probability that a line-of-credit loan will be secured, however.  In 
contrast, the estimated model for traditional loans shows the probability of a secured loan to 
increase with no prior information about the borrower or with a longer-lived lender-borrower 
relationship (the coefficient estimates of NOPRINFO and LNLENGTH are both positive).  The 
former result implies lenders protect themselves against unknown informationally opaque 
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borrowers by increasing the probability they require security, whereas the latter result is 
consistent with lenders using relationships to learn about assets available to serve as collateral, as 
per the information capture view (H4). 
 Chi-square tests of the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients of the relationship 
variables are jointly zero in estimates of the full model further support the importance of 
relationships to decisions about security for both line-of-credit loans and traditional loans.  The 
test statistics, reported at the bottom of Table 8, show rejection of the hypothesis at the 5% level 
for line-of-credit loans, and rejection at the 1% level for all traditional loans as well as all loans.  
Thus like the models of credit availability seen earlier, the chi-square tests for the models of loan 
security support H1 over H2.  Traditional loans, like lines of credit, are relationship loans. 
 
III. C. Results from Estimated Models of Interest Rate Spreads 
 To study the impact of pre-existing relationships on the spread over prime required by the 
lender we follow Berger and Udell (1995), Blackwell and Winters (1997), Elsas and Krahnen 
(1998) and Bodenhorn (2003). We estimate the following model of the loan rate premium over 
prime using the method of ordinary least squares:
21
 
Interest rate spread over prime 
 
 = β0 + β1 firm attributes + β2 market attributes  
+ β3 loan contract attributes  
+ β4 lender-borrower relationship attributes  + error term 
(4) 
 
Table 9 reports estimates of Equation (4) produced using data for the 703 sample loan 
applications that were accepted, the applications for which loan rate data were available.  In all, 
six model estimates are reported: two estimated on data for all loans, two estimated on data for 
line-of-credit loans, and estimated on data for traditional loans.  The first estimate in each pair is 
an estimate of a restricted version of Equation (4) that omits the relationship explanatory 
variables; the second of each pair is an estimate of the full model.    
Estimates of the restricted models fit the data poorly.  The adjusted R
2
 is highest for the 
model estimated on traditional loan data (R
2 
= 0.137) and lowest for the model estimated on line-
of-credit data (R
2
 = 0.074). The explanatory variables proxying firm characteristics achieve 
statistical significance sporadically.  Increasing firm age or sales revenue -- indicative of greater 
informational transparency -- significantly reduces the spread paid on traditional loans but not 
line-of-credit loans. Increasing delinquencies on business obligations significantly increases the 
spread paid on line-of-credit loans, though not traditional loans.  Curiously, higher public risk 
ratings reduce the spread paid on line-of-credit loans, a result that cannot be readily explained.
22
  
The explanatory variables proxying contract characteristics exhibit the most consistent impact on 
spread.  Larger loans significantly reduce the spread paid on both line-of-credit loans and 
traditional loans, while increasing loan term significantly reduces the spread paid for traditional 
loans.  Both results are consistent with loan pricing to reflect falling administrative costs per 
                                                 
21
 Petersen and Rajan (1994),  Harhoff  and  Körting (1998), Angelini et al. (1998) and Degryse and van Cayseele 
(2000) also estimate models similar to Equation (4) except that the dependent variable is the loan rate rather than the 
spread. 
22
 While a lender with more accurate private information about a firm’s risk characteristics might well be expected 
to reduce his loan rate, the negative coefficient estimate of RATING implies that public ratings consistently 
overstate borrower risk. 
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dollar lent.  The spreads paid on secured and unsecured loans are statistically indistinguishable, 
both for line-of-credit and traditional loans. 
Adding the relationship variables to the restricted models and re-estimating improves 
somewhat the fit of the estimated models while having little impact on the coefficient estimates 
of the non-relationships variables.  The coefficient estimates of LNFIRMAGE, BUSDELINQ 
and LNSALES decline somewhat in absolute value and lose statistical significance in the 
estimated models for all loans, line-of-credit loans and traditional loans, respectively.  But the 
estimated coefficients of the remaining non-relationship variables are virtually unaffected. 
Although estimates of the full model better fit the data than estimates of the restricted 
model regardless of whether the models are estimated using observations on all loans, line-of-
credit loans or traditional loans, the relationship explanatory variables contribute almost no 
statistically significant coefficients to the estimated full models.  The estimated coefficients of 
NOPRINFO, NUMOLOANSOURCES and PRIMEFI fail to approach statistical significance in 
any of the three models estimates.  Only the estimated coefficients of LNLENGTH provide some 
evidence favorable to the importance of lender-borrower relationships, albeit weak evidence. 
Consistent with the reputation enhancement view, the estimated coefficients of LNLENGTH are 
all negatively signed. The estimated coefficient of LNLENGTH achieves statistical significance 
in the model estimated on data for all loans, but narrowly misses significance at the 10% level in 
the models estimated for line-of-credit loans and traditional loans. 
The failure of relationship explanatory variables to exhibit measurable effects on loan 
rates is not new: Petersen and Rajan (1994), Harhoff and Körting (1998), and Elsas and Krahnen 
(1998) report similar results, as do Berger and Udell (1995) for sample firms with below-median 
assets.  But before concluding that relationships exerted no significant impact on the loan pricing 
decisions of lenders in our sample, we explore two other possibilities.   
First, we consider the possibility that in our sample correlations among the relationship 
variables prevent these variables from exhibiting measurable influences on the spread in models 
estimated using the OLS technique. The large (in absolute value) correlation coefficients among 
the relationship variables reported in Table 4 lend credence to this possibility. To assess whether 
multicollinearity might account for the relationship variables’ statistically insignificant 
coefficient estimates, we performed F-tests of the hypothesis that the coefficient estimates of the 
relationship variables are jointly zero.  The F-statistics, reported at the bottom of Table 9, 
soundly reject this hypothesis at conventional significance levels for the models estimated on 
data for all loans, for line-of-credit loans, and for traditional loans.  Thus, relationships appear to 
influence loan pricing decisions for both credit lines and traditional loans despite statistically 
insignificant estimated coefficients for the relationship variables in estimates of the full model. 
Second, following Berger and Udell (1995), we consider the possibility that the pricing of 
bank loans to very small firms is so idiosyncratic as to mask the explanatory power of even 
highly significant loan pricing determinants in models estimated on data for small and large 
firms.  Similar to Berger and Udell we re-estimate Equation (4) on data for firms with assets 
above and below $364,000, the median for our sample.  We report these results in Table 10.  In 
all, six estimates of (4) are reported: two estimated using observations on both line-of-credit and 
traditional loan applications, two estimated using observations on line-of-credit applications, and 
two estimated using observations on traditional loan applications.  In each pair the estimate on 
the left was produced using observations only on firms having above-median assets, while the 
estimate on the right was produced using only observations on firms having below-median 
assets. 
The estimates of (4) reported in Table 10 support the claim of idiosyncratic loan pricing 
for very small firms, but chiefly in the pricing of line-of-credit loans.  Estimates of (4) produced 
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using observations on the above-asset-median firms consistently fit the data better than those 
produced using observations on the below-asset-median firms, judged by the adjusted R
2
s.  
However, the fit difference is substantial only for line-of-credit loans (adjusted R
2
s of 0.596 vs.  
–0.058 for line-of-credit loans, compared with adjusted R2s of 0.149 vs. 0.058 for all loans and 
0.156 vs. 0.117 for traditional loans).  For line-of-credit loans, the improved fit achieved by 
excluding observations on below-asset-median firms is accompanied by substantial changes in 
the estimated coefficients of PROPART_PERDEL, LNFIRMAGE, RATING and, to a lesser 
extent, LNMATURITY and SECURED: they all change their algebraic signs and achieve or 
approach statistical significance. In contrast, estimating (4) using observations on line-of-credit 
loan applications from below-asset-median firms yields coefficient estimates of all the 
explanatory variables little different than those produced by estimating (4) using observations on 
line-of-credit loan applications from firms of all sizes. 
The Table 10 results also weaken the case for significant relationship effects in the 
pricing of line-of-credit loans, but strengthen this case in the pricing of traditional loans.  In the 
two estimated models for line-of-credit loans, none of the coefficient estimates of the 
relationship variables achieves statistical significance.  Moreover, F-tests of the hypothesis that 
the estimated coefficients of the relationship variables are jointly zero, reported at the bottom of 
Table 10, fail to reject the null for both estimated models for line-of-credit loans. Thus in our 
sample, lender-borrower relationships do not appear to have consistent, significant impacts on 
the pricing of line-of-credit loans.  
The irrelevance of relationships to the pricing of line-of-credit loans does not apply to the 
pricing of traditional loans. In the two estimated models for traditional loans reported in Table 
10, the estimated coefficients of the relationship variables LNLENGTH, NOPRINFO and 
NUMOLOANSOURCES all have the predicted algebraic signs, though only the estimated 
coefficient of NUMOLOANSOURCES achieves statistical significance, and then only in the 
model estimated for firms with above-median assets.  The coefficient estimate of the fourth 
relationship variable, PRIMEFI, is positively signed in the estimated model for larger firms -- 
consistent with the information capture view (H4) -- but negatively signed in the estimated 
model for smaller firms -- consistent with the reputation enhancement view (H3).  The estimated 
coefficient of PRIMEFI achieves statistical significance in the model estimated for larger firms 
but not for smaller firms.  Nevertheless, F-tests of the hypothesis that the estimated coefficients 
of the four relationship variables are jointly zero is rejected by the data for firms with above- and 
below-median assets. Thus, lender-borrower relationships appear to have consistent, significant 
impacts on the pricing of traditional loans in our sample.  This result supports H1 over H2. 
Traditional loans have a stronger claim to being relationships loans than line-of-credit loans, 
judging from our results.  
 
IV. Summary and Conclusion 
 Lender-borrower relationships potentially affect small businesses’ access to funds by 
affecting the availability of credit, the security they must offer to get credit, and the price of 
credit. Theorists have presented competing views of how relationships might affect small 
businesses’ access to funds, here referred to as the reputation enhancement and information 
capture views. Previous empirical studies of relationships’ impacts on small businesses’ credit 
market access use data on lines of credit on grounds that lines of credit are, by their design, 
relationship loans.    
 This study has investigated the influence of lender-borrower relationships on such 
traditional small business loans as mortgages, equipment loans and motor vehicle loans, in 
addition to lines of credit. While traditional loans may entail looser lender-borrower relationships 
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because they finance one-time, non-recurring credit needs and provide their own collateral, we 
argued that traditional loans are potentially relationship loans due to information asymmetries 
that arise because small businesses are informationally opaque.  We framed our argument in the 
form of competing hypotheses: H1, traditional loans are relationship loans, vs. H2, traditional 
loans are transaction (non-relationship) loans. We investigated empirically the impact of 
relationships on small businesses’ access to credit by investigating relationships’ impacts on the 
availability, required security, and price of traditional loans and credit lines.  We also 
investigated whether the evidence better supported the reputation enhancement or information 
capture views, again framing this investigation in terms of competing hypotheses: H3, 
relationships evolve as per the reputation enhancement view, vs. H4, relationships evolve as per 
the information capture view.  
 Our empirical evidence clearly supports hypothesis H1 and more consistently supports 
hypothesis H4 than H3.  Test statistics from estimated logistic regression models of the 
probability that a lender grants a small business a loan show that relationship variables affect 
acceptance probabilities for both credit lines and traditional loans.  Likewise, test statistics from 
estimated logistic regression models of the probability that a lender requires security from a 
small business show that the relationship variables affect the probabilities of both credit lines and 
traditional loans.  Finally, test statistics from estimated ordinary least squares regression models 
of the spread between the prime rate and the loan rate show that relationship variables contribute 
significant explanatory power in the models for traditional loans but not in the models for credit 
lines.  Throughout our empirical work evidence consistent with both H3 and H4 is found, but 
support for H4 is more consistent.  We conclude that traditional loans are indeed relationship 
loans and that credit availability and terms evolve more nearly as described by the information 
capture view.  
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Table I 
Summary of Empirical Studies 
 
Authors Data 
Effect of Relationships on 
View evidence 
supports 
Availability 
of Credit 
Collateral 
Requirements 
Lending 
Rate 
Petersen & Rajan (1994) 
1988-89 
NSSBF, all loan 
types 
improves n.a. no effect ambiguous 
Berger & Udell (1995) 
1988-89 
NSSBF, bank 
lines of credit 
n.a. 
less required 
for larger 
firms 
lower for 
larger 
firms, no 
effect for 
smaller 
firms 
reputation 
enhancement 
Blackwell & Winters (1997) 
proprietary 
sample of bank 
lines of credit to 
small US 
businesses 
n.a. n.a. lower 
reputation 
enhancement 
Cole (1998) 
1993 NSSBF, 
all loan types 
improves n.a. n.a. ambiguous 
Harhoff and Körting (1998) 
proprietary 
survey of 1509 
German small 
business line of 
credit loans 
no effect less required no effect 
reputation 
enhancement / 
ambiguous 
Elsas and Krahnen (1998) 
proprietary 
survey of loans 
to medium-size 
German firms 
by 5 German 
banks; line of 
credit loans 
n.a. n.a. no effect ambiguous 
Angelini et al. (1998) 
proprietary 
sample of  
small Italian 
firms; interest 
rates line-of-
credit loans  
improves n.a. higher 
information 
capture 
Degryse and van Cayseele 
(2000) 
proprietary 
sample of  bank 
loans to small 
Belgian firms; 
non-line-of-
credit loans 
n.a. more required higher 
information 
capture 
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Table II 
Variable Names and Descriptions 
 
Variable Name Description 
 
Firm Characteristics 
 
LNFIRMAGE     Log of the number of years the firm has been owned by its current 
owners. 
LNSALES Log of total annual sales in fiscal year 1998.  
BUSDELINQ Number of business obligations on which the firm has been 60 days or 
more delinquent in the past 3 years. 
PROPART_PERDEL For firms organized as proprietorships and partnerships, number of 
personal obligations on which the firm’s principal owner has been 60 
days or more delinquent in the past 3 years; zero otherwise. 
RATING Firm’s Dun and Bradstreet score, coded 1 (lowest risk), 2,3,4, or 5 
(highest risk).  
 
Market Characteristics 
 
HHI3_B Scale based on the Herfindahl index for commercial banks in the MSA 
or county where the firm is headquartered, coded 1 (most 
competitive), 2, or 3 (most concentrated). 
 
Contract Characteristics 
 
ACCEPTED =1 if the firm’s more recent loan application was accepted; =0 
otherwise. 
SECURED =1 if the firm’s most recent loan is secured by collateral or a guarantor; 
=0 otherwise. 
SPREAD The interest rate on the firm’s most recent loan less the prime lending 
rate prevailing when the loan was made, in percent. 
LNAMOUNT Log of the dollar amount of the loan most recently applied for. 
LNMATURITY Log of the number of months over which the firm’s most recent loan is 
to be repaid. 
 
Relationship Variables 
 
LNLENGTH Relationship length between a firm and the lender most recently applied 
to, measured as the log of one-plus-months-of-relationship.  
NOPRINFO =1 if a firm had no prior relationship with the lender it applied to for its 
most recent loan; =0 otherwise. 
NUMOLOANSOURCES Number of lenders to a firm besides the lender most recently applied to. 
PRIMEFI =1 if the lender most recently applied to is the firm’s primary financial 
institution; =0 otherwise. 
Note: All models estimated also included three binary variables to control for the borrowing firm’s 
organizational form (partnership, S-corporation or C-corporation) and eight binary variables to control 
for the firm’s industry based on the firm’s 2-digit SIC code (construction and mining, primary 
manufacturing, other manufacturing, transportation, wholesale trade, retail trade, insurance and real 
estate, business services and professional services). 
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Table III 
Summary Statistics for All Loans Applications, Line-of-Credit  
Loan Applications and Traditional Loan Applications 
            
 
 
 
           
            
            
            
            
            
            
            
(1)     (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variable all loans All Applications 
Line-of-Credit 
Loan Applications 
Traditional Loan 
Applications t tests 
    (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a) (4b) (5a)  (5b) 
  Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Mean 
Std 
Error Mean 
Std 
Error t  p-value 
Firm Characteristics             
   LNFIRMAGE 2.16 0.03 2.16 0.03 2.08 0.05 2.20 0.03 -2.08 ** 0.04 
   LNSALES 12.57 0.06 12.57 0.06 12.24 0.11 12.76 0.07 -4.15 *** <0.01 
   BUSDELINQ 1.50 0.04 1.50 0.04 1.56 0.06 1.48 0.04 1.08 0.28 
   PROPART_PERDEL 0.76 0.04 0.76 0.04 0.76 0.06 0.76 0.05 -0.09 0.93 
   RATING 2.49 0.02 3.04 0.04 3.10 0.06 3.00 0.05 1.36 0.18 
Market Characteristics            
   HHI3_B   2.49 0.02 2.51 0.03 2.48 0.02 0.70 0.48 
Contract Characteristics            
   ACCEPTED 3.04 0.04 0.78 0.01 0.65 0.03 0.86 0.01 -7.61 *** <0.01 
   LNAMOUNT 10.38 0.06 10.38 0.06 10.20 0.11 10.48 0.06 -2.44 ** 0.02 
   LNMATURITY¹   3.22 0.06 2.29 0.11 3.61 0.06 -11.55 *** <0.01 
   SECURED¹   0.78 0.02 0.67 0.03 0.82 0.02 -4.50 *** <0.01 
   SPREAD¹   1.01 0.09 1.17 0.19 0.94 0.10 1.17 0.24 
Relationship Variables            
  LNLENGTH 2.80 0.07 2.80 0.07 2.59 0.11 2.92 0.09 -2.31 ** 0.02 
  NOPRINFO 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.29 0.03 0.25 0.02 1.17 0.24 
  NUMOLOANSOURCES 1.10 0.05 1.10 0.05 1.11 0.08 1.10 0.06 0.15 0.88 
  PRIMEFI 0.51 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.51 0.03 0.51 0.02 0.05 0.96 
              
Number of Loans   862 302 560   
 
 
 
The variables listed in Column 1 correspond to the variables defined in Table 2. For every variable in 
Column 1 summary statistics are reported for all loans (Column 2), for line-of-credit loans (Column 
3) and for traditional loans (Column 4).  Column 5 presents t-tests of the hypothesis that the means 
for line-of-credit and traditional loan applications are identical. Column 5a shows t-statistics and 
Column 5b the associated p-values.  Sample means statistically different at the 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels are designated ***, ** and *, respectively.  
¹  Data for LNMATURITY, SECURED and SPREAD are available only for accepted loans.  703 of the 862 sample loans 
were accepted, of which 213 were line-of-credit loans and 490  were traditional loans.  
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Table IV 
Correlation Matrix  
  
27 
Table V 
Summary Statistics for Accepted and Rejected Loan Applications 
 
 
 
         
 
Panel A:  All Loan Applications 
(1)   (2) (3) (4) 
Variable all loans Approved Denied t tests 
    (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a)  (4b) 
  Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t  p-value 
Firm Characteristics           
   LNFIRMAGE 2.16 0.03 2.22 0.03 1.93 0.06 4.39 *** <0.01 
   LNSALES 12.57 0.06 12.80 0.07 11.75 0.14 7.21 *** <0.01 
   BUSDELINQ 1.50 0.04 1.36 0.03 2.01 0.10 -7.74 *** <0.01 
   PROPART_PERDEL 0.76 0.04 0.59 0.03 1.38 0.12 -9.19 *** <0.01 
   RATING 2.49 0.02 2.97 0.04 3.29 0.08 -3.63 *** <0.01 
Market Characteristics           
   HHI3_B 3.04 0.04 2.47 0.02 2.56 0.04 -1.86 * 0.06 
Contract Characteristics ¹           
   LNAMOUNT 10.38 0.06 10.42 0.06 10.24 0.13 1.27 0.20 
Relationship Variables           
   LNLENGTH  2.80 0.07 2.87 0.08 2.53 0.16 2.05 ** 0.04 
   NOPRINFO 0.27 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.35 0.04 -2.83 *** <0.01 
   NUMOLOANSOURCES 1.10 0.05 1.12 0.05 1.03 0.10 0.80 0.43 
   PRIMEFI 0.51 0.02 0.54 0.02 0.40 0.04 3.48 *** <0.01 
            
Number of Loans   703 159   
¹ No statistics are reported for the contract characteristic variables LNMATURITY, SECURED or SPREAD as data for these variables were only 
available for accepted loan applications. The variable ACCEPTED is reflected in the approved / denied dichotomization. 
The variables in Column 1 correspond to the variables listed in Table 2.  For every variable in 
Column 1 summary statistics are reported for all approved loan applications (Column 2) and for 
all rejected loan applications (Column 3).   Panel A reports sample statistics for all loan 
applications. Panels B and C report the same information for line-of-credit loan applications 
and traditional loan applications, respectively.  Column 4 presents t-tests of the hypothesis that 
variable means for approved and denied loan applications are identical. Column 4a shows t-
statistics and Column 4b the associated p-values.  Sample means statistically different at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels are designated ***, ** and *, respectively.  
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Table V, continued 
           
Panel B:  Line-of-Credit Loan Applications 
(1)   (2) (3) (4) 
Variable   Approved Denied t tests 
    (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a)  (4b) 
  Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t  
p-
value 
Firm Characteristics           
   LNFIRMAGE 2.08 0.05 2.13 0.05 1.99 0.09 1.42 0.16 
   LNSALES 12.24 0.11 12.53 0.14 11.70 0.19 3.51 *** <0.01 
   BUSDELINQ 1.56 0.06 1.28 0.06 2.05 0.14 -6.24 *** <0.01 
   PROPART_PERDEL 0.76 0.06 0.50 0.04 1.21 0.16 -5.80 *** <0.01 
   RATING 2.51 0.03 3.00 0.07 3.29 0.10 -2.39 ** 0.02 
Market Characteristics           
   HHI3_B 3.10 0.06 2.50 0.04 2.53 0.05 -0.41 0.68 
Contract Characteristics           
   LNAMOUNT 10.20 0.11 10.36 0.13 9.91 0.17 2.02 ** 0.04 
Relationship Variables           
   LNLENGTH  2.59 0.11 2.62 0.13 2.52 0.21 0.43 0.67 
   NOPRINFO 0.29 0.03 0.26 0.03 0.35 0.05 -1.68 * 0.09 
   NUMOLOANSOURCES 1.11 0.08 1.17 0.09 1.01 0.14 1.05 0.29 
   PRIMEFI 0.51 0.03 0.56 0.03 0.43 0.05 2.21 ** 0.03 
            
Number of Loans   213 89   
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Table V, continued 
          
Panel C:  Traditional Loan Applications 
(1)   (2) (3) (4) 
Variable   Approved Denied t tests 
    (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a)  (4b) 
  Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t  p-value 
Firm Characteristics           
   LNFIRMAGE 2.20 0.03 2.26 0.04 1.83 0.09 4.31 *** <0.01 
   LNSALES 12.76 0.07 12.92 0.07 11.82 0.19 5.48 *** <0.01 
   BUSDELINQ 1.48 0.04 1.40 0.04 1.96 0.15 -4.52 *** <0.01 
   PROPART_PERDEL 0.76 0.05 0.62 0.04 1.63 0.19 -7.78 *** <0.01 
   RATING 2.48 0.02 2.95 0.05 3.29 0.13 -2.48 *** 0.01 
Market Characteristics           
   HHI3_B 3.00 0.05 2.46 0.03 2.61 0.06 -2.06 ** 0.04 
Contract Characteristics           
   LNAMOUNT 10.48 0.06 10.44 0.07 10.73 0.18 -1.53 0.13 
Relationship Variables           
   LNLENGTH  2.92 0.09 2.98 0.09 2.54 0.25 1.74 * 0.08 
   NOPRINFO 0.25 0.02 0.24 0.02 0.34 0.06 -2.00 ** 0.05 
   NUMOLOANSOURCES 1.10 0.06 1.10 0.07 1.07 0.14 0.18 0.86 
   PRIMEFI 0.51 0.02 0.54 0.02 0.36 0.06 2.89 *** <0.01 
            
Number of Loans   490 70   
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Table VI 
Estimated Models of Credit Availability 
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Table VII 
Summary Statistics for Secured and Unsecured Loans 
 
Panel A:  All Loans 
(1)   (2) (3) (4) 
Variable all loans Secured Unsecured t tests 
    (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a)  (4b) 
  Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t  p-value 
Firm Characteristics           
   LNFIRMAGE 2.16 0.03 2.22 0.03 2.24 0.07 -0.27 0.79 
   LNSALES 12.57 0.06 13.01 0.07 12.06 0.14 6.04 *** <0.01 
   BUSDELINQ 1.50 0.04 1.44 0.04 1.10 0.05 4.11 *** <0.01 
   PROPART_PERDEL 0.76 0.04 0.56 0.04 0.68 0.05 -1.46 0.14 
   RATING 2.49 0.02 3.01 0.05 2.81 0.09 2.06 ** 0.04 
Market Characteristics           
   HHI3_B 3.04 0.04 2.48 0.02 2.46 0.05 0.38 0.70 
Contract Characteristics ¹           
   LNAMOUNT 10.38 0.06 10.66 0.07 9.58 0.14 7.42 *** <0.01 
   LNMATURITY   3.41 0.06 2.53 0.15 6.55 *** <0.01 
Relationship Variables           
   LNLENGTH  2.80 0.07 2.76 0.09 3.28 0.17 -2.86 *** <0.01 
   NOPRINFO 0.27 0.02 0.27 0.02 0.16 0.03 2.83 *** <0.01 
   NUMOLOANSOURCES 1.10 0.05 1.22 0.06 0.80 0.10 3.26 *** <0.01 
   PRIMEFI 0.51 0.02 0.52 0.02 0.62 0.04 -2.18 ** 0.03 
            
Number of Loans   577 126   
¹ All sample loans are accepted loans.  The variable SECURED is reflected in the secured / unsecured dichotomization. 
The variables in Column 1 correspond to the variables listed in Table 2.  For every variable in Column 1 
summary statistics are reported for secured loans (Column 2) and for unsecured loans (Column 3).   Panel 
A reports sample statistics for all loans. Panels B and C report the same information for line-of-credit loans 
and traditional loans, respectively.  Column 4 presents t-tests of the hypothesis that variable means for 
secured and unsecured loans are identical. Column 4a shows t-statistics and Column 4b the associated p-
values.  Sample means statistically different at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels are designated ***, ** and *, 
respectively.  
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Table VII, continued 
 
     
           
Panel B:  Line-of-Credit Loans 
(1)   (2) (3) (4) 
Variable   Secured Unsecured t tests 
    (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a)  (4b) 
  Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t  p-value 
Firm Characteristics           
   LNFIRMAGE 2.08 0.05 2.10 0.07 2.19 0.09 -0.84 0.40 
   LNSALES 12.24 0.11 12.86 0.17 11.86 0.21 3.46 *** <0.01 
   BUSDELINQ 1.56 0.06 1.38 0.08 1.08 0.06 2.56 *** 0.01 
   PROPART_PERDEL 0.76 0.06 0.48 0.05 0.55 0.07 -0.80 0.42 
   RATING 2.51 0.03 3.03 0.08 2.94 0.13 0.63 0.53 
Market Characteristics           
   HHI3_B 3.10 0.06 2.54 0.04 2.41 0.07 1.59 0.11 
Contract Characteristics           
   LNAMOUNT 10.20 0.11 10.82 0.14 9.41 0.25 5.34 *** <0.01 
   LNMATURITY   2.64 0.12 1.57 0.20 4.75 *** <0.01 
Relationship Variables           
   LNLENGTH  2.59 0.11 2.36 0.16 3.16 0.25 -2.82 *** 0.01 
   NOPRINFO 0.29 0.03 0.28 0.04 0.20 0.05 1.24 0.22 
   NUMOLOANSOURCES 1.11 0.08 1.32 0.11 0.86 0.16 2.41 ** 0.02 
   PRIMEFI 0.51 0.03 0.54 0.04 0.60 0.06 -0.77 0.44 
            
Number of Loans   154 59   
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Table VII, continued 
 
          
Panel C:  Traditional Loans 
(1)   (2) (3) (4) 
    Secured  Unsecured t tests 
    (2a) (2b) (3a) (3b) (4a)  (4b) 
  Mean Std Error Mean Std Error Mean Std Error t  p-value 
Firm Characteristics           
   LNFIRMAGE 2.20 0.03 2.26 0.04 2.27 0.10 -0.12 0.90 
   LNSALES 12.76 0.07 13.06 0.08 12.23 0.19 4.39 *** <0.01 
   BUSDELINQ 1.48 0.04 1.46 0.05 1.11 0.07 3.04 *** <0.01 
   PROPART_PERDEL 0.76 0.05 0.59 0.05 0.77 0.08 -1.65 * 0.10 
   RATING 2.48 0.02 3.01 0.05 2.70 0.14 2.26 ** 0.02 
Market Characteristics           
   HHI3_B 3.00 0.05 2.46 0.03 2.49 0.08 -0.53 0.60 
Contract Characteristics           
   LNAMOUNT 10.48 0.06 10.60 0.07 9.72 0.16 4.97 *** <0.01 
   LNMATURITY   3.68 0.06 3.30 0.16 2.52 *** 0.01 
Relationship Variables           
   LNLENGTH  2.92 0.09 2.89 0.10 3.39 0.23 -2.01 ** 0.04 
   NOPRINFO 0.25 0.02 0.26 0.02 0.12 0.04 2.80 *** 0.01 
   NUMOLOANSOURCES 1.10 0.06 1.18 0.07 0.75 0.13 2.50 *** 0.01 
   PRIMEFI 0.51 0.02 0.51 0.02 0.64 0.06 -2.08 ** 0.04 
            
Number of Loans   423 67   
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Table VIII 
Probability of Security 
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Table IX 
Interest Rate Spread 
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Table X 
Interest Rate Spread by Firm Size 
